We begin Kaufman's account by examining how he elucidates what the concept of God means and how it significantly fulfills human needs. Kaufman asserts that God is transcendent of the entirety of man's world.[1] By this he means that we are unable to den ote God through any dimension of human experience or identify him with an object in the world. We cannot directly identify God because he is abstract and inaccessible to us (any such attempt to do so would be idolatrous). We lack the ability to procure full knowledge of him. As we shall see eventually, this limitation plays an important role in Kaufman's theology. He appropriately calls this unknown "x" the real referent for "God" or the "real God". From this real God, we are able to formulate the ap parent (or available) God, that is, a particular imaginative construct. This available referent has a profound influence on human life and thought. It is this God we personalize in prayer and worship.
The conception of God as a creation of human imagination is obviously the product of a long and tortuous history and has been shaped by the experience and reflection of many peoples.[4]
Furthermore, various imaginative constructs exist for us to consider, each with its adherents and advocates. Not one, however, is fully able to justify itself against its critics. Alternative methods of theological criticism and construction will perpetually arise to be examined, none fully able to argue its claims or demolish its oppon ents.[5]
The significance of the real God can be seen in this context when it relativizes and restricts peoples' claims to theological knowledge (or religious claims). Kaufman further claims that if we take the concept of God seriously, we will comprehend the wh ole structure of meaning within which he lives as oriented toward and grounded upon this incredibly significant source of meaning and being. Thus, the apparent God will be understood, in a phenomenological sense, as himself "objective" and "real".[6] As an objective element, God orders our lives in a framework such that we can have experiences and find meaning.
What then, for Kaufman, makes a religious claim true? He acknowledges that the only knowledge of the real God's existence is the faith in it. Kaufman suggests that it is a mistake to speculate as to whether the apparent God corresponds to what really e xists out there.[8] He goes on to assert that:
the only relevant question of truth that can be directly considered here concerns that ordering of life and the world which faith imposes: is such an ordering appropriate to the world as we experience it and to the nature of our human existence.[9]
We shall now turn to William James and pragmatism. We should first note that philosophic inquiry in pragmatism as a method requires a basis in concrete experience and its repercussions.[13] James applied the pragmatic method to the epistemological prob lem of truth. He searches for the meaning of 'true' by examining how the idea functions in our lives.[14] Pragmatism is the mediator between our minds and reality. A theological idea has pragmatic truth when it contains value for concrete life. Its r elation to the other truths contribute to how much more true they are.
Truth is generally defined and accepted as a property of certainty in our ideas. Truth denotes the agreement of our ideaswith reality. A point of dissension with pragmatists arises when intellectuals make the assumption that truth in essence signifies an inert static relation. Pragmatists, concerned with the concrete value of truth realization, hold that an idea is made true by events, processes of verification that do not lead to impediment or contradiction. More specifically for James, a theory ne eds to work in that, "It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly."[15]
James goes on to introduce his conception of possibilities and apply it to religious claims. He states that the eminent religious divergence exists between those who are convinced that the world inevitably must be saved, and those who believe that it may possibly be saved. Pragmatically, a possibility indicates that there are no preventive conditions present (i.e. no self-contradiction), and that some of the terms or conditions for creating the possible thing actually exist. James applies this concept t o the salvation of the world. This would mean that some of the conditions of the world's salvation actually do exist. The more conditions there are, and the fewer preventing conditions one can find, the better-grounded is the salvation's possibility, an d , thus, the more probable does the fact of deliverance become.[16] James goes on to advocate meliorism which lies between optimism and pessimism. Meliorism treats salvation as a possibility; it is neither necessary, nor impossible. This possibility becomes more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.[17] For James, it is obvious that pragmatism would be drawn to meliorism.
James next asserts that, by acting, we can create the world's salvation. He presupposes a world/reality that is still in the process of being made. Our actions contribute to the subject and predicate part of reality. Through action, every ideal actual ized will be one moment in the world's salvation. He does state that these !deals are not simply abstract possibilities. Rather, "they are grounded in live possibilities".[18] Thus, religious claims are grounded because they are live possibilities.[19]
Like James, Kaufman presupposes a world/reality that is, to some extent, open to human objectives. Man is conceived of as a determining, active entity. However, Kaufman is distinct from James in that all of reality, including the actions of man, is met aphysically grounded in an ultimate, objective reality. Accordingly, as we have seen for Kaufman, religious claims are grounded as such.
What are the implications of this divergence in the theories upheld by Kaufman and James? I would argue that this deviation first creates a fine distinction between the relativism created by each of their imaginative constructs. Kaufman's construction o f the apparent God, based on the objective, real God, is more of an interpretation relative to James' purely created construction.
Though both of their constructions are relative, Kaufman would assert that he is less relative in that his construction is based on an objective reference. For pragmatic purposes, we might point out that since there is no proof of the existence of his ob jective reference, he is essentially in the same position as James. On the surface, this would appear to he the case. However, I would argue that as we apply the pragmatic test to each of their conceptions of religious claims, we are able to see the sig nificance of Kaufman's foundation. As mentioned earlier by Kaufman, we must stake ourselves and our lives on one position or another in order to act and work in the world as the terms of it specify. This commitment would not carry as much weight if it were not based on an objective reference. Constructs created in accordance with James' theory require commitment only for the sake of preserving the meaning we derive from them. Though somewhat influential, this commitment does not have the same impac t in our lives.
For our final point of inquiry, is Kaufman truly pragmatic in the sense that James is? Kaufman is pragmatic in the sense that he is concerned with the pragmatic function of his theory. He further has a pragmatic justification in that we are unable to su bscribe to the apparent God without the real God. However, I would argue that, although Kaufman is pragmatic, he transcends pragmatism in that his conception of truth is fundamentally based on (an interpretation of) the Absolute.[20] There is a foundati on, an objective reality (unlike James' pure construction).[21] This is one of the reasons I prefer Kaufman's theory. In addition, I believe that Kaufman's theory carries positive social implications. It guards against the evils of dogmatism. Although we can believe with conviction in the apparent God, we remain humble with respect to the fact that no human being is able to possess full knowledge of God. Thus, an atmosphere conducive to negotiation (based on the absolute) is created. Although I like James' theory, I would criticize him for creating a possible catastrophe. It would seem to me that he assumes that all ideals held by people are good. What happens when the majority of people in the world hold an ideal that is quite evil? They contrib ute their ideals, actualizing the possibility. I would criticize James not only for his failure to address this problem, but also for the ambiguity of his entire theory.
I shall now conclude with a quote that captures the spirit , the essence of Kaufman's philosophy. This quote by Unamuno can be found in Kaufman's book, God The Problem.
To believe in God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to act as if He existed; it is to live by this longing and to make it the inner spring of our action.
James, William, Pragmatism, Hackett Publishing Company, United States of America, 1981.
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