Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his Lectures on Religious Belief offers a solution to this problem. Through the notion of his language-game analysis, Wittgenstein challenges the assertion that proofs or evidence have anything to do with religious belief. In this picture of language, Wittgenstein is striving to maintain meaning in many areas of life. He rejects the notion that science is able to answer all the questions of the world. He concedes that science is very helpful in explaining how the world operates, but maintains that it cannot give answers to why there is a world at all. Wittgenstein aims to place science and religion into separate spheres. The role of religion is important because it gives humankind an avenue from which essential existential and religious questions can be addressed. The goal of the religious language-game is not to determine how the world operates, but rather to help solve the "riddles of life."(Wittgenstein, PI)
Ultimately Wittgenstein concludes that proof, evidence, and reasons have nothing to do with the formulation of religious belief. Religious belief is not rational nor irrational, but something separate and distinct from the concept of rationality. Rationality plays a role in the language-game of science, not religion. One cannot justify one's religious views from the standpoint of science, just as it would be absurd to assert the theories of quantum mechanics from a religious point of view. For Wittgenstein, science and religion are independent and necessary to life, and because the goal of each activity is different they cannot judge the merit of one another.
St. Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury first developed the ontological proof for the existence of God, in the eleventh century. Renee Descartes modified this proof in his Meditations on First Philosophy. The proof asserts that the existence of God is entailed in the idea of God. If one is able to comprehend the idea of God, then God necessarily exists. The first premise of this proof is that God is the sum of all perfections. God is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good, etc. The idea of God contains perfection in all possible attributes. The second premise is that it is better to exist in reality than solely in the mind. In essence then it is a higher perfection to exist than to not exist. From these premises it is concluded that God necessarily exists. (Descartes, Meditation V, p. 154-159) The existence of God is not probable or possible, but a logical necessity. If the premises are accepted then the conclusion necessarily follows. This is a logically valid argument; the premises do indeed lead to the conclusion necessarily. This proof is a priori because it does not rely upon empirical data. This proof is not arrived at through an observation of the world, but entirely through reason, independent of experience.
St. Thomas Aquinas offered his famous "Five Ways" or philosophical arguments for the a posteriori existence of God, in his Summa Theologiae. The most celebrated of these proofs is the cosmological argument for God's existence. The first premise of the argument is (1) The universe could not have been the cause of itself. (2) It could not have come from nothing. (3) It could not have always existed; (4) Therefore there must have been a first uncaused, cause of all things. (Miller, p. 21) This argument, originally espoused by Aristotle as the "unmoved mover," is altered here by Aquinas and stems from the notion of the cause-effect relationship. Something cannot come from nothing, and the universe, and for that matter the individual, exists, as demonstrated by empirical observation. There then must be a cause to the universe, for if no cause existed then the logical consequence is that the universe does not exist, for something must have a cause in order to exist, or in essence be an effect. The first cause must be outside the causal chain. If the first cause is directly linked to the effects in a causal chain of events, the inevitable question arises, what caused the first cause? Therefore, in order to assert the theory of a first cause one must adopt a theory similar to Aristotle's. The unmoved mover is the cause of all that exists, but does not itself have a cause, or is unmoving. This unmoved mover is in fact, God, and necessarily exists. The proof is a posteriori because it is based upon sensory experience. One observes the world and is able to see causal links between events and is also able to scientifically ascertain the existence or non-existence of an entity. Seeing the world in a cause-effect relationship leads one back to the first cause. If the first cause is not outside the causal chain then what results is an infinite digression of cause.
Hume, the greatest of the British empiricists used the problem of evil in his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In considering how it was that God could exist in spite of evil in the world, Hume offered the following sentiments, "Is he willing to prevent evil but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?" (Wainwright, p.70) In essence, Hume is arguing that the concepts of God and evil are in direct contradiction with each other. Clearly evil exists in the world. Therefore, belief in God is irrational. How can a theist assert God's existence in the face of such moral atrocities as apartheid or holocaust? Clearly, these are just two examples of evils that exist in the world. How can they be explained and still maintain the existence of God?
One possible counter argument to the problem of evil presented here by Hume is that, what is perceived as evil isn't evil at all, but rather exists for the greater good of the world. There is a greater good that will come as a result of the perceived evil, which in the end will bring greater happiness than the harm originally thought. Although this objection is a distinct possibility, it is really insufficient. It is of course, logically possible for this to be the case, but is in reality simply an argument from ignorance.
To paraphrase the previous argument, "For all we know, what we perceive as evil may actually be good. We cannot possibly understand the motivations and intentions of God…." Anytime reasoning of this nature takes place we, as philosophers, ought to dismiss it immediately following the "for all we know" statement. This reasoning is offering an objection to a very real problem by appealing to something that could possibly be the case. Occam's Razor is a principle that assets that all things being equal, the simplest explanation is the correct one. If this principle is true and applied to this situation then further credence is supplied to Hume's argument. What is the more complex explanation, i.e. which explanation requires the greatest inductive leap, or which explanation entails a greater degree of metaphysical consideration. Is it more plausible that evil exists concurrently with the notion of an omnipotent God? That what is evil exists in fact for the greater good of the world, and that because we as humans have a limited understanding of the world, we cannot grasp the true reality of what constitutes evil? On the other hand, is it more likely that evil exists in the world, thus eliminating the possibility of a God with the qualities that Descartes' supposed? The answer is clear. The latter explanation is the more logical and simple one, and corresponds to the world as we know it to a greater degree. If this is indeed the case, what logically follows? Either we are left without a God, or a God remains that is not omnipotent or omnibenevolent. In either case this type of God, really is not the God originally conceived of, and some may argue not a God at all.
The problem of evil does provide a real and actual threat to the rational belief in God. Albert Camus also addresses the problem of evil in his Myth of Sisyphus. From an existential point of view, Camus looks at the problem of evil as it relates to the search for meaning in life. Camus, as an atheist, takes Hume's argument to a different level. Camus doesn't spend much, if any, time trying to establish that evil is present in the world. Instead he focuses on the ramifications of such a view;
The second way in which this view denies reality is it entails the previously noted contradiction in the nature of God. On one hand God is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, while seemingly allowing evil to exist concurrently. Clearly the simpler explanation is not that God exists in this complex and counterintuitive way, but rather that we as humans have free will and God does not exist. Either way, for Camus the answer to this question is irrelevant. Life is meaningless either way. If the world is structured in such a way that we do not have free will and that God is the cause of evil, then individual existence is truly devoid of meaning. We are simply fulfilling our predetermined path and have no power or ability to think on our own.
The alternative explanation is we are completely free and completely responsible for our own actions. There can be nothing outside of ourselves that can give us meaning. God's role is not merely religious but also provides a possible meaning or explanation to our existence. Without this grounding, one must seek meaning in life elsewhere. No such meaning can ever be found for Camus. If life has any meaning it can only be derived from the transcendence of one's own meaninglessness. It is here that the title of his book takes on its significance. In Greek mythology, Sisyphus is punished by Zeus and must spend eternity pushing a rock up a hill. When he gets to the top of the hill, the rock rolls back to the bottom and he must push it back up. This is how Camus sees the human condition. It is only when humans realize the meaninglessness of life that they are able to transcend it. A person who is able to transcend his/her condition is "superior to his fate." (Camus, p.l21)
What then is the nature of the religious language-game, what sort of activity takes place in this game? As with all language-games the meaning of the words within the religious language-game is determined by the language-game itself. The word 'belief' is important both in the religious language-game and the science language-game. Where those who have attempted to prove or disprove God's existence rationally have failed, is assuming that the word 'belief' is identical in both language-games. This is clearly not the case. Belief in science is something completely different than belief in religion. When someone says "I believe that the world is not flat" something different is being said than "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth." Under the guise of the referential theory of language, which Wittgenstein asserted in his earlier work the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the meaning of the word 'belief' would be meaningful only if it referred to an object or fact in the world. This theory does not allow for the same word to have different meanings depending on the context. Wittgenstein's language-game analysis avoids this problem and offers an alternative that truly mirrors the way in which language operates in the world. It follows from this that words in different language-games could have different meanings. Therefore, the word 'belief' can be demonstrated to have a different meaning in the scientific language-game than the religious language-game. If it can be shown that these are different versions of 'belief' and that the rational justifications for God's existence or non-existence rest upon a scientific meaning of 'belief,' then it can be shown that these proofs play no role and are irrelevant to the religious language-game.
What then does 'belief' mean in the respective language-games? To say that one believes something in science is to argue a claim on the basis of evidence or proof. A belief that the sun is the center of the solar system is a scientific claim. There is corresponding empirical data that justify this claim. An individual is able to cite reasons for this belief and postulate theories in accordance with it. For religion, belief is not something based on evidence or proof at all. To say that "I believe in God" is not a claim based on empirical data or reasons. It something that is arrived at when one goes through the process of answering the key existential questions. 'Belief' in the religious language-game is not reasonable as 'belief' in the scientific language-game is, nor does it pretend to be. Religious belief is not based on rationality, but how one sees the world. Here Wittgenstein makes a key differentiation between himself and Kierkegaard. It was Kierkegaard's claim that holding a religious belief was irrational. Wittgenstein develops the position that a belief in the religious language-game is not rational or irrational. Rationality does not play a role in the religious language-game. Speaking about how science and religion differ on this point of rationality, Wittgenstein notes that; "You could also say that where we are reasonable, they are not reasonable--meaning they don't use reason here." (Lectures, p.59) If this point is granted, then at any juncture if science uses reason as grounds for an objection to it must conform to the depth grammar of that particular language-game, for if it does not it cannot be spoken of meaningfully.
What results from this conclusion is that the proof for the existence and non-existence of God play no role in the religious language-game. St. Anslem's ontological proof plays no role in the religious language-game. Intuitively this is not entirely surprising. When one is asked the question; "Do you believe in God, and if so why?" and the ontological proof is given as a reply, the inquirer remains unsatisfied. Instead, what they are likely searching for is an explanation of how that individual sees the world. A suitable answer may be that "The world makes more sense with God than without." This reply does not rest upon evidence or proof, but is rather the result of an individual searching for an answer to the existential questions about the "riddles of life," and how one develops a religious point of view to address these questions. Conversely, the counter evidence provided against God's existence is subject to the same kind of scrutiny. Objections, like the problem of evil, that rest upon empirical evidence or reason can no longer be considered within the religious language-game. However viable they may be in terms of reasonability, it is irrelevant to the religious language-game.
Clearly, Wittgenstein has placed science and religion into separate spheres, unable to criticize one another. A key distinction must be made here as to what Wittgenstein means by the religious language-game. One who has developed a religious point of view need not partake in organized religion. Following Wittgenstein's thought, the religious language-game is not an inclusive subset of organized religion or Christianity. This is not what Wittgenstein is connotating when he speaks of a religious language-game. It may very well be the case that certain individuals adopt organized religion within the religious language-game. Christianity or other organized religions may serve as a vehicle for answering the questions of life. However, an individual may be playing the religious language-game and not take part in any organized religion. If an individual, outside of organized religion addresses the existential questions necessary in developing a religious point of view, then they indeed are playing the religious language-game. Similarly, one need not believe in God to take part in the religious language-game. If one, after developing a religious point of view, sees the world making more sense without God than with God, then they are playing the religious language-game. Again, all that is required is for one to seek answer to the "riddles of life."
Conversely, it is also possible for those within organized religion to not be playing the religious language-game. People who attend church services or functions, or even believe in God may be outside the religious language-game. If for example, a person were to blindly accept God in his life without ever inquiring about God's nature or his own existence, this person is not playing the religious language-game. If the existential questions are not asked and the religious point of view is not developed, then consistent with Wittgenstein, it can be said that the person is not playing the religious language-game. It is in this way that an interesting paradox of a person being "religious" but not playing the religious language-game emerges.
Another, more important example of someone who is "religious" or a theist not playing a religious language-game are those who attempt to prove God's existence rationally. Anselm and Aquinas, despite their strong faith in God's existence introduced proofs for God's existence that have nothing at all to do with the religious point of view. As demonstrated in this paper, these proofs are given from the perspective of the scientific language-game. These proofs are not religious, and therefore fall under the scrutiny of science. Criticism is possible within a language-game, and therefore these proofs based upon scientific reasoning are subject to the same rules as other scientific theories. As such, principles such as Occam's Razor easily refute the claims made by these proofs. Therefore, just as both science and religion dismiss superstition, both the religious language-game and the scientific language-game reject the rational proofs for God's existence.
Which leads into the rational reasons for disproving God's existence. The same mistake that the theist makes by asserting God's existence on the basis of rational proofs, is also made by the atheist who bases reasoning as a objection to God's existence. Atheism is no more scientific than theism. From a rational view point it has been shown that belief in a Divine Being is irrational. Kierkegaard was not mistaken about this. What he and the others are mistaken of, according to Wittgenstein, is applying rationality to the religious language-game. Religious and non-religious belief has nothing at all to do with rationality' and those who claim atheism based upon science are no more justified than those who base belief on rational proofs.
For in the presence of God there is less a problem of freedom than a problem of evil. You know the alternative: either we are not free and God the all-powerful is responsible for evil. Or we are free and responsible but God is not all-powerful. All scholastic subtleties have neither added to nor subtracted anything from the acuteness of this paradox. (Camus, p.56)
What Camus has done is provide additional reasons for the non-existence of God. Is it, given Occam's Razor, more likely that we have free will and that God is not all-powerful, and therefore not the God that is conceived of? Or is it more likely that there is no free will and God is responsible for evil? The latter sentiment requires one to advocate the denial of reality in two ways. The first is that humans do not have free will. This is counter-intuitive to every notion of what it means to be human. It entails the assertion that we do not make any decisions and that everything is predetermined, and we are helpless to change our destiny.
Wittgenstein, in speaking about religion and religious belief does so from the perspective of the language-game analysis. This picture of language asserts that the meaning of words and phrases are determined by the context, or game, in which it plays a role. For Wittgenstein, there are infinitely many language-games corresponding to innumerable situations in life. The language-game itself is regulated by depth grammar. Depth grammar is what makes the language-game possible, by setting the boundaries of what can and cannot be said. Words or activities within a language-game take on meaning that is exclusive to that particular language-game. Hence, what is meant by 'belief' or 'truth' is different in the religious language-game than the science language-game. Wittgenstein argues in his Lectures and Conversations that the depth grammar that regulates the religious language-game is different than the depth grammar that regulates science. He also postulates that as long as the primary goal of a particular language-game is different from another, they are immune to criticism from each other. Science, which is concerned with determining how the world is ordered has a distinctly different goal in mind than the religious language-game, which is concerned with questions of an existential nature. The religious language-game has merit and is immune from science because it asks important questions that science is unable to touch. It serves a human need that is unable to be fulfilled anywhere else.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein's language-game analysis as it applies to religious belief allows one to solve an age old problem. The logical contradiction that exists between an all-perfect God and problem of evil has now been solved. Belief in God is no longer subject to proof or evidence or empirical justification. The religious point of view is how one answers the existential questions, or how one sees the world. The result may be individualistic and perhaps enter into relativity, but it does give religion immunity from the assualts of science. Like the rest of Wittgenstein's language-game analysis, this theory of religion is consistent with our human needs. Clearly, today's society relies largely upon the theories and principles of science. Wittgenstein is not denying science, as much as he is preserving the rightful place of religion as an important part of life. Essential to being human is coming to terms with the existential questions and developing a religious point of view. Science can tell us about the world, but we need the religious point of view to tell us about our existence. As Wittgenstein illustrated in the Tractatus, paragraph 6.52; "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched."
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